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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISPLACEE RELOCATION IN FEDERAL
URBAN RENEWAL PROJECTS: A NEW APPROACH?
INTRODUCTION
Prior to June, 1968, persons displaced by federal urban renewal
programs lacked standing to contest the adequacy of relocation standards
provided by the local agencies and approved by the Secretary of the
national housing program.' However, in June of 1968, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in the case of Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redevelopment Agency2 that displacees in federal urban renewal areas
could sue to contest the adequacy of the relocation procedure as pre-
scribed by section 105 (c) of the Housing Act of 1949.'
The purpose of this note is to scrutinize the provisions of the Hous-
ing Act; to evaluate displacees' need for judicial review of the local
director's decisions regarding relocation standards; to trace the history
of court interpretation of section 105(c); and to discuss and analyze
the decision in the Norwalk case and its possible impact upon existing
federal law.
THE HOUSING ACT OF 1949
As enacted, the primary purpose of the Housing Act of 1949 was:
[T]he elimination of substandard and other inadequate hous-
ing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the
realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a
suitable living environment for every American family, thus
contributing to the development and redevelopment of com-
1. Green Street Ass'n. v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967) ; Johnson v. Redevelop-
ment Agency of Oakland, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963) ;
Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. HHFA, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963) ; Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 978 (1959) ; Hunter v. City of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
2. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
3. The urban renewal program was created as Title I of the Housing Act of 1949,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-68 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-69(c) (1968). See C.
ABRAMS, THE CITY IS THE FRONTIER (1965) [hereinafter cited as ABRAMS]; S. GREER,
URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES (1965) [hereinafter cited as GREER] ; URBAN
RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY (J. Wilson ed. 1966) ; Foard & Feffer-
man, Federal Urban Renewal Legislation, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 635 (1960);
Johnstone, The Federal Renewal Problem, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 301 (1958); Note,
Judicial Review of Urban Redevelopment Agency Determinations, 69 YALE L.J. 321
(1959); Note, Protecting the Standing of Renewal Site Families to Seek Review of
Community Relocation Planning, 73 YALE L.J. 1080 (1964); Note, Judicial Review of
Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966 (1968).
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munities and to the advancement of the growth, wealth, and
security of the nation.'
This statement of policy, contained in the Act of 1949, is based on the
Housing Act of 1937, which calls for "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings
for families of low income."5 There is no reference to adequate displacee
relocation in the statements of policy in either act. It has been suggested
that the problems of relocation are secondary to the primary problem of
blight removal in urban areas.6
As originally designed, the urban renewal program was to be
administered by the federal administrator7 of the Housing and Home
Finance Agency (HHFA).8 As a result of amendments to the Housing
Act of 1949, HHFA became the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD)' and the administrator's title was changed to
Secretary of HUD."0 Although the administrative titles and agencies
have changed since 1949, the basic provisions of the Act have remained
the same.
4. Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
1441 (1967). See also Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 § 1601, 42 U.S.C. §
§ 1441 (a) (1968) (Congressional reaffirmation of the national housing goal); Housing
and Urban Redevelopment Act of 1968 §§ 1602-03, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b), (c) (1968)
(Presidential reports to Congress regarding urban renewal progress).
5. Housing Act of 1937 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1937), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
1401 (1968).
6. See S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1949). This bill provided for:
1) a declaration by Congress of the national objectives in housing and the policies to
be followed in attaining them; 2) the authorization of federal financial aid to
communities to start slum clearance; 3) the authorization for a continuation and
expansion of public housing for low income families; 4) an authorization for a
comprehensive program of federal research in housing aimed at relieving technical,
social and economic problems in the housing field; and 5) financial assistance for the
provision of decent housing for those who live and work on farms.
Commissioner Slayton of the Urban Renewal Administration stated before the
Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency that
relocation is an obstacle to be overcome rather than a central objective. The clearance
and redevelopment of the blighted areas was a national objective, more so than the
improvement of living conditions for families in the blighted areas. Hearings
on Housing Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 391-92 (1963). See also GtEER 96;
Frieden, The Legal Role in Urban Development, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 856 (1965).
7. Housing Act of 1949 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1451 (1965), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
1451 (a) (1968).
8. Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964); as amended, 42 U.S.C.
1441 (1967).
9. Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. III, 1967), amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 1441 (1949).
10. Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. III, 1967), amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 1451 (1965). For the purpose of this note administrative reference will be made to
HUD, except in the later case discussions where it is necessary to differentiate between
the HHFA and HUD. Similarly, reference will be made to the federal director
instead of the administrator.
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Urban renewal is to be locally initiated.1' After the Local Public
Agency (LPA)"2 petitions HUD for financial assistance, the Secretary
of HUD delegates administrative authority to a local federal director who
is required to enforce the requirements of the Act.' The LPA is then
required by the Act to submit a "workable program" for community
improvement to the federal director as a prerequisite to any loan or
capital grant that might be made."4 An integral part of this "workable
program" is an adequate relocation assistance program. Section 105(c)
provides that:
Contracts for loans or capital grants ... shall require that-
(c) (1) There shall be a feasible method for the temporary
relocation of individuals and families displaced from the urban
renewal area, and there are or are being provided, in the urban
renewal area or in other areas not generally less desirable ...
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings equal in number to the
number of and available to such displaced individuals and fami-
lies and reasonably accessible to their places of employment....
(2) As a condition to further assistance after August 10, 1965,
with respect to each urban renewal project involving the dis-
placement of individuals and families, the Secretary shall re-
quire, within a reasonable time prior to actual displacement,
satisfactory assurance by the local public agency that decent,
safe and sanitary dwellings as required by the first sentence of
this subsection are available for the relocation of each such
individual or family.'
Many problems have arisen because of the gap between the statutory
ideal and the practicalities of urban renewal relocation.' Two funda-
11. Housing Act of 1949 § 101(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 1451(a), (b) (1965) as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1451 (a), (b) (1968).
12. Housing Act of 1949 § 101 (b), 42 U.S.C. § 1451(b) (1965), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 1451 (b) (1968) describes a local public agency as "agencies established on
a State, or regional (within a State), or unified metropolitan basis or as are established
on such other basis as permits such agencies to contribute effectively toward the solution
of community development or redevelopment problems on a State, or regional (within a
State), or unified metropolitan basis."
13. Housing Act of 1949 § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 1456 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
1456 (1968).
14. Housing Act of 1949 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1965), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1451(e) (1968).
15. Housing Act of 1949 § 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1964), as amended; 42
U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1968).
16. For reports on the inadequacies of present relocation procedures see U.S.
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RELOCATION: UNEQUAL
TREATMENT OF PEOPLE AND BUSINESSES DISPLACED By GOVERNMENTS 27-52, 114-16, 127
(1965); P. NIEBANcK, THE ELDERLY IN OLDER URBAN AREAS 126-62 (1965); See
260
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mental issues have been whether the LPA has provided such a workable
relocation program and whether the director has abused his discretion in
granting the federal money when a workable relocation program has in
fact not been provided. Prior to 1968 these issues were dismissed, not
upon the merits, but upon the theory that the displacees lacked standing to
sue."
DISPLACEES' NEED FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DIRECTOR'S
DISCRETIONARY FINDINGS REGARDING RELOCATION
Several factors have contributed to difficulties which have brought
about the need for judicial review of relocation procedures. First, in the
haste and anxiety of petitioning for federal funds and beginning the
urban renewal project, the LPA's have gained notorious reputations for
presenting to the director only the positive information gained from
their surveys."8 These findings are aimed primarily at convincing the
director that the statutory standards have been complied with, rather than
at critically appraising the local situation and the feasibility of relocating
displacees. 9 Local data recorded in official Boston and Cleveland
surveys,"0 when compared with independent surveys, were found to be
self-serving and inaccurate.2 Furthermore, social and physical features of
relocation were ignored and it was found that the standards set by law
were compromised in about one-half of the cases.22 In a 1963 report, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare chastised the superficial
local surveys and remarked that "it can hardly be said that the general
picture of relocation has provided reason for applause .. .2 Thus, the
displacee has not found due regard for statutory standards in LPA reports
and at this point must look to the director to halt programs in which
relocation provisions have not been made for the displacees.
At this point another problem becomes apparent regarding enforce-
ment of the statutory provisions. When the LPA's report reaches the
ABRAMS 132-54; A. SCHORR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL INSECURITY 61-68 (1963); Note,
Judicial Review of Urban Redevelopment Agency Determinations, 69 YALE L.J. 321
(1959); Note, Protecting the Standing of Renewal Site Families to Seek Review of
Community Relocation Planning, 73 YALE L.J. 1080 (1964); Note, Judicial Review of
Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966 (1968).
17. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
18. AiRAMS 135, 143-45; Hartman, The Housing of Relocated Families, in
URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 322, 326 (J. Wilson ed. 1966).
19. Hartman believes that the LPA has no choice but to issue extremely positive
relocation reports because anything less might produce legal, political and ethical con-
flicts and could slow up the entire rebuilding effort, the principal goal of the LPA.
Hartman, supra note 18, at 326.
20. ABRAMiS 138.
21. Id. at 143.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 143-44. See A. SCHORR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL INSECURITY 62, 65 (1963).
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director, he must personally decide upon the feasibility of such a program.
By statute, he has the affirmative duty to inspect the local agency's
reports and to judge the practical applicability of an urban renewal
program to a given area.24 Oftentimes the director's scrutiny of the
local agency's reports is merely a rubber stamp process ;5 and, if the
local reports are analyzed, the director's research of the project rarely
goes beyond the four corners of the LPA report. 6 As a result, the true
housing situation can go undetected. 7
Among the critical areas overlooked by the LPA when petitioning
for federal financial assistance and by the director when approving the
local reports are: 1) housing shortages throughout the urban area; 2)
shortages of decent, safe, and sanitary housing within the general area;
3) shortages of low rental housing for the low-income displacees; and
4) unavailability of good housing, in many areas, to minority racial
groups because of discriminatory housing practices.2"
Housing shortages are presumed by the very passage of the Housing
Act.2" Congress expressly stated that the primary purpose of the Act was
to abolish blighted areas and in their stead construct adequate numbers of
low and middle-income housing." However, surveys show that the
national urban renewal program has resulted in destruction of four
dwelling units for each one built, while other surveys show a two-to-one
ratio. 1 A survey of cases reaching appellate courts show the existence
of urban renewal projects which replaced substandard housing with
shopping centers and universities.2 2 Such municipal and private con-




27. Abrams hypothesizes that even where relocation procedures are recognized as
inadequate by the director, he will rarely superimpose his judgment upon that of the
local renewal agency. Id.
28. Hartman, supra note 18, at 324.
29. Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
1441 (1967) reads:
The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and
the health and the living standards of its people require housing production
and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing
shortage. ....
The Housing and Urban Development Act § 1601, 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1968) reads:
The Congress finds that the supply of the Nation's housing is not increasing
rapidly enough to meet the national housing goal, established in the Housing
Act of 1949, of the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent
home and suitable living environment for every American family.
30. Housing Act of 1949 § 2, U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
1441 (1967). See note 6 supra.
31. GREER 56 n.20.
32. Green Street Ass'n. v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967) (Negro housing,
both standard and substandard, destroyed to accommodate mall facilities) ; Harrison-
262
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struction compounds the housing shortage and the indirect result is an
increase in the rent displacees must pay elsewhere."
The lack of clean, safe and decent (standard) housing in most
urban communities is another pressing problem. 4 Displacees often relo-
cate into substandard housing, either because it is all that is available or
because it is all they can afford. A 1961 study showed that in forty-one
cities, 60 percent of the displaced tenants were merely relocated into
other slum areas; the percentage in large cities was even higher.8 These
slumareas consequently became overcrowded and deteriorated at a faster
rate.8 Another study of four large cities showed that only 25.9 percent
of the displacees used the LPA relocation assistance agency; and of the
74.1 percent who did not use the assistance agency, 90 percent went into
substandard housing.8 7 A solution for the problem of substandard housing
eradication is elusive, for under present practices the slum areas merely
shift from one part of a city to another, and displacees manage to stay
only one step ahead of the demolition crews.8
Still another problem of relocation is the higher rentals paid by
displacees after relocation. Generally, these tenants have low incomes and
cannot afford an increase in rent. 9 A study of Boston's West End
District" showed the median rent rose from $41 per month to $71 per
month, a 73 percent increase. 1 The study also showed that before
relocation, 88 percent of the tenants paid less than $55 per month and 2
Halsted Commuinty Group, Inc. v. HHFA, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 915 (1963) (substandard housing destroyed to accommodate University of
Illinois expansion) ; Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978
(1959) (housing destroyed to accommodate Fordham University expansion).
33. ABRAMS 145-50.
34. Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
1441 (1967); The Housing and Urban Development Act §§ 1601, 42 U.S.C. § 1441a
(1968).
35. Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND
THE CONTROVERSY 539 (J. Wilson ed. 1966).
36. Id. See also Hartman, supra note 18, at 321.
37. ABRAMS 144. Section 105(b) was amended in 1965 to provide the displacees
with "information as to real estate agencies, brokers, and boards in or near the urban
renewal areas which deal in residential or business property that might be appropriate
for the relocating of displaced individuals, families. . . ." Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1455(b) (Supp. III, 1967), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1455(b) (1949). However, there
are no studies available which show the effects of the amendment upon relocation
procedures.
38. ABRAMS 144; Hartman, supra note 18, at 321.
39. The majority of displacees are poverty-stricken within the meaning of the
Social Security Administration's guidelines. See U.S. Housing and Home Finance
Agency, The Housing of Relocated Families: Summary of a Census Bureau Survey,
in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 337 (J. Wilson ed. 1966).
40. Hartman, supra note 18. The West End study, which covers Boston's relocation
efforts during 1958-59, is one of the few comprehensive studies showing the effects of
relocation in a large city.
41. Id. at 306.
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percent paid more than $75 per month. After relocation, only 30 percent
paid less than $55 per month and 45 percent were paying more than
$75 per month."2 These figures, while staggering in the abstract, become
more meaningful when it is realized that only 1 percent of the displacees
surveyed were Negroes, who traditionally pay higher rent for housing."
Perhaps the most pressing relocation problem is the resistance
Negroes and other minority groups meet when forced to relocate. The
percentage of displacees who are non-white is estimated to be 70 per-
cent.44 One author has characterized urban renewal as Negro clearance
rather than slum clearance. 5 While white racism is presently the subject
of much controversy," its effects are clearly seen in relocation of
minority groups in urban areas." The high rent problem mentioned above
is compounded when faced by non-white groups, as is the problem of
availability of standard, decent housing." The problem is poignantly
illustrated by an Akron, Ohio study which showed that Negroes can
expect to search for rehousing for twenty weeks, while for whites the
search time averages only seven weeks. 9 It is submitted that in approving
a workable program, the director, as a matter of practicality, should take
into consideration not only what decent, safe and sanitary housing is
available for low rental rates, but also whether the housing is equally
available to all displacees.
42. Id. at 306 and accompanying Tables VI and VII. The same study showed that
after relocation 20 percent of the displacees were paying more than $95 per month.
43. Hartman, supra note 18, at 311.
44. ABRAMS 136.
45. Gans, supra note 35, at 539. See also NATIONAL CoMMITrE AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION IN HoUSING, HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUILDS GHETTOS 6-7,
11-12 (1967); ABRAMS 145; GREER 54-55, 146-64; Frieden, The Legal Role in Urban
Development, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 856, 867-69 (1965).
In Green Street Ass'n. v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967), the plaintiffs'
complaint alleged "Negro removal." However, because the Negro plaintiffs failed to
allege "Negro removal" as the sole purpose of the renewal project the court would not
allow a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968) the plaintiffs' complaint alleged unequal treatment for whites and non-whites
regarding relocation procedure. Here the non-white displacees had standing to assert
their claims even though they did not claim the sole purpose of the renewal project
was to discriminate on the basis of race.
46. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISODERS (N.Y.
Times Co. 1968).
47. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968) ; Green Street Ass'n. v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967).
48. Hartman, supra note 18, at 312. Frieden, The Legal Role in Urban Develop-
ment, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 856 (1965) ; Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation
in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966 (1968).
49. Hartman, supra note 18, at 312.
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NON-JUDICIAL RECOURSE FOR DISPLACEE GRIEVANCES
Once the director makes the decision to proceed with the slum
clearance, it has been suggested that there is little the displacee can do to
enforce a neglected statutory provision. 0 With little money, short notice
and no subpoena power, a displacee lacks the tools with which to effec-
tively challenge an inadequate relocation program." However, there are
provisions for extra-judicial review which are available to the dis-
possessed tenant. At least one court has ruled that due process demands
that the director's decision be reviewable by a public hearing, 2 while
another court required the hearing as a matter of course." The critical
problem encountered at such a hearing is that the displacee is asking the
director to overrule his prior decision, to make another analysis of the
rehousing potential for displacees, and to halt the project, if necessary,
until adequate relocation facilities are available.
Social critics seriously doubt the quality of such a hearing.5
The director is caught between his obligation to enforce the statutory
requirements on the one hand and the necessity of showing progress
with the program on the other.5 The director is under no less pressure
from the LPA, which by this time is politically and financially committed
to the urban renewal program, and from the private redevelopers who are
50. ABRAMS 140-45; Note, Judicial Review of Urban Redevelopment Agency
Determinations, 69 YALE L.J. 321 (1959); Note, Judicial Relview of Displacee
Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966 (1968).
51. Note, Judicial Review of Urban Redevelopment Agency Determinations, 69
YALE L.J. 321, 329 (1959).
52. Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1959).
53. Green Street Ass'n. v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967).
54. See note 50 supra.
55. ABRAMS 138. There appears to be nothing in the Housing Acts which would
require the director to take action based on the information provided at the hearing.
Although section 106(c) (1) of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1)
(1968) provides: "[I]n the performance of, and with respect to, the functions, powers
and duties vested in him by this subchapter, the Secretary . . . may (1) sue and be
sued . . . ," only the Second Circuit has allowed the Secretary to be sued under section
105(c).
Suits under other sections of the Housing Acts have also been maintained. In
Merge v. Sharott, 341 F.2d 989, 994 (3d Cir. 1965), moving expenses for families and
businesses were compensable under section 114, 42 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 1465 (1968) and displacees had standing to challenge the HHFA's
determinations regarding moving expenses. It must be noted that section 114(d)
expressly declares the Secretary's acts are discretionary and non-reviewable. Yet the
Merge court allows displacees standing to contest as arbitrary and capricious the
Secretary's determination of reasonable moving fees. Two queries are presented: 1)
Why did the court disregard the express declaration by Congress that such acts by the
Secretary were non-reviewable? and 2) Section 114(d) directly forbids suits contesting
expense amounts allowed under that section. Why did Congress not expressly forbid
suits under section 105(c) regarding relocation requirements? If it be that Congress
made no such prohibition on 105(c) suits, why then have courts refused to grant
standing to displacees alleging violations of relocation requirements?
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anxious to grab their fair share of the federal money. At least one court
inadvertently put the situation in true perspective :56 it held that the
displacees were entitled by statute57 to a public hearing to contest the
feasibility of the relocation procedure, but that the hearing might be
conducted before the LPA and not before the local federal director.5"
Indeed, the complex machinery of urban renewal is gaining momentum
and it has been suggested that it is impractical to expect official recal-
citrance at such a late date.5
COURT INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 105 (c) REGARDING
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RELOCATION PROBLEMS
Hunter v. City of New York
The first court to substantially interpret section 105(c) of the
Housing Act of 1949 was the New York County Supreme Court in the
56. Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959).
57. Housing Art of 1949 § 105(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1964), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1968).
58. The court ruled that it was not necessary for the federal administrator to
hear the displacees' complaints at the public hearing. 263 F.2d at 250. Section 101(c)
of the Housing Act of 1949 provides:
(2) on the basis of his (administrator's) review of such program, the
Administrator determines that such program meets the requirements of this
subsection. . . . And provided further, That, notwithstanding any other
provisions of law which would authorize such delegation or transfer, there
shall not be delegated or transferred to any other official (except an officer
or employee of the Housing and Home Finance Agency serving as Acting
Administrator during the absence or disability of the Administrator or in the
event of a vacancy in that office) the final authority vested in the Administrator
(i) to determine whether any such workable program meets the requirements
of this subsection . . . or (iii) to determine that the relocation requirements
of section 1455 (c) of this title have been met....
59. Note, Judicial Review of Urban Redevelopment Agency Determinations,
69 YALE L.J. 321, 328-29 (1959).
In Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Oakland, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963)%
a state statute [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33500 (West Supp. 1968)] allowed
the displacee to appeal from the public hearing. However, Riganti v. McElhinney, 56
Cal. Rptr. 195, 248 Cal. App. 2d 116 (1967) interpreted § 33500 as setting a time for
bringing an action questioning the validity of a redevelopment plan and, as such, was a
statute of limitations and was not to be construed as authorizing the bringing of such
actions.
Most state statutes which deal with housing and relocation problems refer tojudicial review of state housing board or state housing commissioner decisions and fail
to provide displacees with judicial review of state housing board or state housing
commissioner decisions and fail to provide displacees with judicial review of federal
administrative acts under section 105(c) for example: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 1/2, § 179(1935) provides for judicial review in the state appellate or supreme court of state hous-
ing board decisions; N.Y. PuB. HOUSING LAW § 15 (McKinney 1964) provides that the
state housing commissioner may sue or be sued. State courts usually offer no relief to,
displacees suing under the federal housing statutes because the federal questions involved
should be left to the federal courts. See Hunter v. City of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d
841 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
266
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case of Hunter v. City of New York."0 The displacees contended that
the severe housing shortage in New York City made it impossible for
them to adequately relocate; and, because there was no workable reloca-
tion program, the financial aid and redevelopment contracts were invalid
for they were entered into in violation of section 105(c)." A formal
complaint had been filed with the HHFA, but no satisfaction was
accorded the plaintiffs.62 To force the LPA to produce a feasible pro-
gram, the displacees sought to enjoin the progress of the plan for slum
clearance and to enjoin the performance of the contracts between the
federal agency and the LPA, as well as the contracts between the LPA
and the sponsors of the Harlem and West Park renewal areas. The
plaintiffs' entire case rested upon the question of whether there had been
compliance with the statutory standard."3 The court refused to rule
upon the adequacy of relocation potential for the displacees, holding that
the displacees lacked standing to sue.6"
Plaintiffs' counsel admitted there was no express right given by the
statute to sue the administrator, but he argued that the displacees
possessed standing to sue upon the theory that they were the intended
and ultimate beneficiaries of the contract between the federal government
and the LPA.6" The court dismissed this argument, saying that while
this may have been the statute's intended purpose, the plaintiffs had no
vested or property right in the laws except those expressly protected by
constitutional provisions. Although the general public may be the intend-
ed beneficiaries of such a contract, this did not per se vest the legal
capacity to sue in every person; and because plaintiffs failed to show "an
injury or threat to a particular right of their own, as distinguished from
the public's interest," they lacked standing to sue. 6 Coupled with this
argument was the court's assumption that if Congress had intended to
give displacees a cause of action to review the Administrator's actions,
it would have expressly authorized it.67
Three facets of this case command attention. First, standing is
denied the plaintiffs although the court admits that dispossessed tenants
are actually the intended and ultimate beneficiaries of the contract be-
tween the HHFA and LPA. However, the lack of a vested right dis-
allows the displacees' right to claim, in a court of law, abuse of discretion
60. 121 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
61. Id. at 844.
62. Id. at 848.
63. Id. at 844.
64. Id. at 846.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 845.
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on the administrator's part in approving the renewel project.6 8
Coupled with this formal argument was the statement that Congress
must expressly state that for the relocation requirements to be enforced
by displaced persons, such persons must have a right to judicial review.69
It is not enough that Congress may have impliedly given such a cause of
action."0
Thirdly, the court ruled that even if displacees had a legal right to
sue under section 105 (c) this suit could not be maintained since a state
court has no jurisdiction over the acts of federal officials administering
federal laws."' This ruling determined the jurisdiction for subsequent
105 (c) cases, all of which were brought in federal courts.
Gart v. Cole
The pivotal case in the chronology of suits seeking judicial review
was Gart v. Cole.72 In Gart, New York City residents and businessmen
of the Lincoln Square Project sued to enjoin further action in an urban
renewal program because of the inadequacy of the relocation plan.
Prior to the letting of the bids to redevelopers, public hearings were
held, but the evidence was not conclusive as to whether the plaintiffs
attended the hearings. Plaintiffs did request a hearing before the Federal
Housing and Home Finance Agency, but the request was denied.73
The displacees attacked the urban renewal program on three
grounds," the third claim challenging the sufficiency of the relocation
plan as prescribed by section 105 (c), and the refusal of the administrator
to grant them a private hearing to present their claims." In pressing this
68. In subsequent cases the "vested right" theory is discarded. Instead, displacees
and courts talk in terms of "legal wrongs."
69. 121 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
70. Id. at 847. Contra, Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) where the court found it was the Congress' specific intent to
allow standing to displacees.
71. The emphasis of this note is on remedies available in federal courts, as the
state court remedies are generally thought to be inadequate. Because substantial
questions regarding the operation of a federal program are involved, state courts have
held that determination of a section 105(c) claim rests with federal agencies. See
Spadanuta v. Incorporated Village of Rockville Center, 33 Misc. 2d 499, 224 N.Y.S.2d
963 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ; Hunter v. City of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ;
Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 259 Minn. 1,
104 N.W.2d 864 (1960); Note, Judicial Review of Urban Redevelopment Agency
Determinations, 69 YALE L.J. 321 (1959) ; Note, Judicial Review of Displacee
Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966 (1968).
72. 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
73. Id. at 250.
74. Id. at 249. The two other claims were 1) that the HHFA's participation in
the Lincoln Square urban renewal project constituted an unconstitutional subsidy to a
religious institution and 2) that the sale by the city of portions of the project area to
sponsors at negotiated minimum bids was invalid.
75. 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959).
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claim, the plaintiffs relied upon the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) 8 to secure judicial review of the administrator's decision. The
district court dismissed the APA claim, stating that the plaintiffs had
suffered no legal wrong from administrative action." In reaching this
conclusion, the court compared the instant case to Kansas City Power
& Light Co. v. McKay"8 and Allied-City Wide, Inc. v. Cole,"9 two
business competition cases. The court refused to distinguish between
business competition and family housing. This distinction was found
crucial in 1968.80
The lower court also dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint that they
were refused a hearing before the administrator,8' ruling that such a
hearing could be delegated to the local public agency. Due process,
according to the court, required no such hearing. 2
By way of dictum, the lower court ruled:
Although I need not go so far as to say that the Housing Act
precludes judicial review in this case, it appears to do so and
that would be another reason for holding that plaintiffs were
without standing under the Administrative Procedure Act.8"
The court did not directly and expressly rule that displacees
lacked standing to sue, but merely hinted that they seemed to be so
76. The Administrative Procedure Act, § 10 5 U.S.C. § 701-06 (Supp. If
1965-66) generally provides that: 1) Any person suffering a legal wrong because oi
the action of any agency or adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of any
relevant statute shall be entitled to judicial review thereof (Id. at § 702) ; 2) Agency
action made reviewable by statute and final agency action where there is no other
adequate remedy are subject to judicial review (Id. at § 704).
The above rights are applicable except so far as statutes preclude judicial review
or agency action is by law committed to agency discretion. (Id. at § 701).
For an analysis of what constitutes a "legal wrong" see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 501-10, 528 (1965) (displacees have suffered
"legal wrong" if the statutory provision intended for their protection has been slighted
by HUD).
77. 166 F. Supp. 129, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
78. 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
79. 230 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
80. For the purposes of this note the "competition cases" include cases in which
the gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint is the allegation of economic loss resulting
from administrative agency determinations. The "competition cases" refer only to
agency actions effecting businesses and not to displacement of individuals and families.
See Alabama Power Co. v. Iches, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Berry v. HHFA, 340 F.2d
939 (2d Cir. 1965); Pittsburgh Hotels Ass'n. v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of
Pittsburgh, 309 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1962); Taft Hotel Corp. v. HHFA, 262 F.2d 307
(2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 967 (1959); Allied-City Wide, Inc. v. Cole, 230
F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
81. Gart v. Cole, 166 F. Supp. 129, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
82. Id.
83. Id. (Emphasis added).
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precluded. s4
Upon appeal, the court held that while the plaintiffs clearly had no
standing to contest the city's open bidding procedures,85 the plaintiffs
did have standing to challenge the administrator's refusal to grant them
an oral hearing regarding the feasibility of the relocation plan. 8 The
lower court's dictum that the Housing Act seems to preclude judicial
review went unmodified, thus leaving the issue officially undecided by
the Second Circuit.8
7
Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. Housing and Home
Finance Agency
In Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. Housing and Home
Finance Agency, 8 the displacees, both residents and businessmen, sought
injunctive relief to enjoin proceedings to acquire and clear an area in
Chicago's Near West Side for the use of the University of Illinois.
Plaintiffs contended that many of them had relocated in the Near West
Side in reliance upon the Chicago Land Clearance Commission Harrison-
Halsted Redevelopment Plan which called for rehabilitation of the
salvageable slums and spot clearance and construction of moderate income
housing in the badly blighted areas. According to the newly proposed
program, all buildings were scheduled for demolition to accomodate the
University of Illinois campus site. Plaintiffs argued that since such
administrative decisions were kept a "high-level secret," and because
plaintiffs relocated in the Near West Side in reliance upon the city's
promise of spot rehabilitation, equity demanded they be accorded injunc-
tive relief.8"
The Chicago Land Clearance Commission held no hearings on the
resolution." After approval of the resolutions, the Planning and Housing
Committee of the Chicago City Council held a public hearing. Objectors
were permitted to air their grievances, but were not allowed to subpoena
witnesses, documents or cross-examine city and Land Clearance of-
ficials."' The displacees' objections were dismissed and although the
State Housing Board agreed to hear their complaints, it abruptly termi-
84. Id.
85. 263 F.2d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1959).
86. Id.
87. Judge Dimock's dictum in the lower court decision was not mentioned in the
appellate court and thus the issue went undecided. This opening allowed the Norwalk
court to grant standing without the necessity of overruling or distinguishing the Gart
case.
88. 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
89. Id. at 101, 103.
90. Id. at 102.
91. Id.
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nated the hearing, ratified the University site project, and forwarded its
findings to the HHFA" Over plaintiffs' objections, the HHFA ap-
proved the project and entered the loan and capital grant contracts.
In addition to their reliance argument, the displacees maintained
that substantial percentages of the residents in the condemned area were
Negro and Mexican, that at that time in Chicago there was extensive
racial discrimination in housing, that the University project would force
these people out of the area and that no standard housing was available
for such persons." Because there was no adequate relocation plan as
required by the Housing Act, the administrator's action in executing
contracts with the Land Clearance Commission was a final and judicially
reviewable act.'
The court held that the taking of land by condemnation proceedings
was a matter for the state courts ;"5 and plaintiffs' suit might be main-
tained in a federal court only if they had standing to sue or if a substantial
federal question was involved. 6 Relying on Frothingham v. Mellon,"
the court ruled that plaintiffs had to show a direct personal injury before
they would have standing to sue; and because the displacees were not
parties to the original contract between the HHFA and LPA, the
plaintiffs had no direct interest in the proceedings.98 Plaintiffs had no
individual legal rights to assert under the Housing Act. An argument
for standing under the Administrative Procedure Act 9 was dismissed.
The court ruled that the weight of authority denies standing to
persons alleging economic injury as a result of agency action regardless
of whether the person's private legal rights have been violated.' By
citing the business competition cases, the court failed to distinguish
between pure economic loss and the severity of taking homes from
persons who have no adequate means for securing rehousing.' Although
the court concedes that "[i]t is understandable that many of the plaintiffs
. . . feel that there has been a breach of faith by various public officials
by reason of the abrupt change in plans from a typically urban renewal
92. Id.
93. Id. at 102,103.
94. Id. at 103.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 103, 104.
97. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
98. 310 F.2d 99, 104 (7th Cir. 1962).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 104, 105.
101. Id. at 105. The Norwalk court has not made such a distinction on the basis
that one's right to adequate housing upon relocation is a personal right which the courts
will recognize. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) [Taken from Brief for
Appellant at 15, Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1968)1.
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plan to the campus project now proposed,"' 2 the court found the dis-
placees had no right to judicial review under the Housing Act and not
even a right to a hearing before the HHFA.' ° The court failed to con-
sider that housing is a necessity of life"" and as such should be protected
from "a breach of faith" by various public officials.
Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Oakland, California
In Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Oakland, California,'
residents of the Acorn Project Area in Oakland sued the LPA to enjoin
the local agency from carrying out the project and to enjoin further
expenditures of federal money because the LPA had not formulated and
executed a feasible plan for relocation of displacees as required by section
105 (c).16 Again, the court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
and failed to reach the merits of the case.' The displacees' argument
that they were third party beneficiaries of the contract between the
HHFA and LPA was rejected because it was found not to be the intent
of Congress to grant displacees a cause of action to enforce the regulations
of section 105(c). The court also found that although plaintiffs might
have met the requirement of a third party beneficiary under California
law, the contract was a federal contract and federal law was applicable to
the situation; and federal law had consistently denied standing to dis-
placed tenants. 8
The court stressed that plaintiffs in California urban renewal pro-
jects have three means of review: 1) a hearing before the administrator;
2) a public hearing; and 3) in California, by state statute any interested
party may attack the proposed redevelopment plan in the state court
within sixty days after the plan has been adopted.0 9 There are, however,
serious doubts regarding the effectiveness of such review procedures
once the plan has been approved."0
Green Street Association v. Daley
In Green Street Association v. Daley,"' displacees alleged that the
Chicago Englewood Project was not a good faith urban renewal project,
102. 310 F.2d at 103.
103. Id.
104. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
105. 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963).
106. Id. at 874.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 874-75.
109. Id. at 875.
110. Note, Judicial Review of Urban Redevelopment Agency Determinations, 69
YALE L.J. 321, 328-29 (1959).
111. 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967).
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but rather a deliberate plan to create a "no-Negro" buffer zone between a
shopping area and the surrounding residential community, devised in
order to make the shopping mall more attractive to white customers."'
Plaintiffs further contended that the urban renewal plan failed to satisfy
the constitutional requirements of due process and freedom from dis-
crimination because the plan was approved by the Chicago City Council
without an adequate hearing and because the plan would relocate the
Negro displacees in segregated areas of the city."'
Count one of plaintiffs' complaint alleged that 80 percent of the
houses in the condemned area were standard and that there were more
than enough parking facilities in the area, but due to the increased con-
centration of Negroes in the Englewood area the business volume of the
shopping center had decreased." 4 It allegedly was the slack in business
which caused the business interests in the area to seek a "no-Negro"
buffer zone around the shopping center. Plaintiffs also contended that
Chicago city officials were induced to join this conspiracy and under
color of law used their offices to perpetrate the conspiracy."' This claim
was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the urban renewal
project was designed solely to deprive them of their rights to own and
occupy the dwellings to be cleared.11
The second count of plaintiffs' complaint alleged defective notice of
the public meeting and intensive harrassment of the plaintiffs when they
attempted to present their evidence at a hearing before the Chicago City
Council."' Plaintiffs were limited to reading a prepared statement and
were not allowed to cross-examine the city officials. Because the format
of the hearing allegedly did not conform to the requirements of section
105 (d) of the Housing Act of 1949,118 plaintiffs contended that they were
denied due process. This count was dismissed by the court upon the basis
of Harrison-Halsted"9 (no basis for federal right to judicial review of
an urban renewal plan), and upon the basis that "no substantial federal
question of due process is raised."' 2 ° The court appears to be saying that
although section 105(d) requires a public hearing before the renewal




116. Id. at 7. The court relied upon Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286
F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961) where the sole plan of the urban renewal project was to
deprive Negroes of their rights to own and occupy housing.
117. Green Street Ass'n. v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 7 (7th Cir. 1967).
118. Id. Section 105(d) of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(1964),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1968) provides that no land may be acquired by the
LPA unless there is first a public hearing following proper notice of such hearing.
119. 373 F.,d at 7.
120. Id.
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plan may be started, courts will not inquire into the alleged insufficiencies
at the public hearing and due process does not dictate that such hearing
be held in a fair manner. Indeed, this seems diametrically opposed to the
intent of Congress, which praised the Act for its built-in safeguards of
due process. 2 '
Plaintiffs' fourth count122 alleged that the relocation provisions were
not feasible as required by section 105 (c) because plaintiffs would be
forced to move into housing which was not decent, safe and sanitary, or
that they would be forced to pay higher rents than they were paying in
Englewood."' Plaintiffs also alleged that they would be forced to move
into segregated areas of the city, that the city officials knew this, and that
to allow such action was violative of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.124
To ratify such a program of relocation is therefore a deprivation of
equal protection of the law. The court again followed the Harrison-
Halsted case and ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing under the Housing
Act. 12 The court ruled plaintiffs' segregation claim inapplicable since the




NORWALK CORE v. NORWALK REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY
On June 7, 1968, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an
opinion which may have a notable effect upon judicial review of section
105 (c) determinations. In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment
Agency".7 the court ruled that displacees having standing to seek an
injunction to enjoin urban renewal projects when it is substantially
alleged that the relocation requirements of section 105 (c) have not been
fulfilled, or when plaintiffs substantially allege that the local agency did
121. S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1949):
This bill sets up adequate safeguards against any undue hardship resulting from
the undertaking of slum clearance under current conditions. It requires, first,
that no slum clearance project shall be undertaken by a local public agency
unless there is a feasible means for the temporary relocation of the families to
be displaced, and unless adequate permanent housing is available or is being
made available to them.
122. Plaintiffs' complaint originally contained five counts. On appeal only the
first, second and fourth counts were in issue.
123. Green Street Ass'n. v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 7-8 (7th Cir. 1967).
124. § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
125. Green Street Ass'n. v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 8 (7th Cir. 1967).
126. Id. at 9. The court draws a distinction between de facto and de jure
segregation. Although the relocation program did not establish segregation as an
institutional product, the practical effect of the renewal was to relocate people on the
basis of race. The Norwalk court recognized this problem and ruled that segregation
was not to be tolerated as a "fact of life" or as an institutional product. Norwalk
CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968).
127. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
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not assure or attempt to assure relocation for Negro and Puerto Rican
displacees to the same extent that they did for whites.128
The South Norwalk Renewal Project No. 1, the program challenged
by the displacees, was approved by the Common Council of Norwalk,
Connecticut on August 28, 1962; and on June 24, 1963, the Norwalk
Redevelopment Agency entered into a loan and capital grant contract with
the HHFA (now HUD). The plaintiffs, all non-white, brought a class
action against the defendants alleging discrimination in connection with
the project.
The displacees alleged that the LPA included in its report that low-
rent housing was available in the city to Negroes and Puerto Ricans, when
in fact the LPA knew that: 1) the turnover figures were exaggerated for
the purpose of favorably influencing the administrator; 2) that there
was a long waiting list for low-rent public housing in the city, and any
attempt to favor the displacees would result in hardship upon the Negroes
and Puerto Ricans already on the rehousing list; and 3) that there was
racial discrimination in the city's private housing market.'29 Furthermore,
it was shown by a Connecticut survey that vacancies in housing projects
were running less than one-half the estimated number, racial discrimina-
tion in the private or open market was flagrant, and non-whites often
paid twice the rent that whites paid.' It was alleged that the local
agency knew of these conditions but still continued the construction of
middle-income housing beyond the financial means of the non-white
tenants.' It was further alleged that the city and the LPA tried to run
the plaintiffs out of the "on-site" housing by making the area unsafe and
unsanitary, by charging usurious rents, by moving families from one
on-site home to another, and by carrying on heavy construction activities
around the on-site housing. 32
The displacees sought judicial review on three theories: 1) that
they had been denied equal protection of the law, and that local officials
intended to deprive the non-white displacees of equal protection of the
law; 2) that relocation procedures provided by the LPA were in
violation of section 105 (c) of the Housing Act of 1949; and 3) that the
discriminatory actions of the LPA were violative of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.'
In considering the first claim, the court recognized the general
128. Id. at 932, 936-39.
129. Id. at 924.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 925.
133. Id.
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reluctance of the courts to interfere in urban renewal programs, but
recognized also that constitutional claims take precedence over policy
determinations.' In discussing the "standing" problem,'35 the court
determined that "standing to sue" required that the plaintiffs have a
personal stake in the outcome, and that the right they seek to assert is
one which the courts will recognize.' The court found that the plaintiffs
did have an interest in the outcome of the proceedings, and because racial
discrimination was involved, it was an interest which the courts would
recognize."3 7
The court, in deciding that the Norwalk displacees possessed a
constitutional interest that the courts would protect, attempted to dis-
tinguish previous decisions which could have led to a contrary result.
The court ruled that Harrison-Halsted was similar to competition cases
previously decided by the Second Circuit. 8 The displacees in Harrison-
Halsted alleged no substantial constitutional claims.. 9 and it was on this
that the Norwalk court could so easily distinguish the Seventh Circuit
decision.
The Norwalk court also attempted to reconcile its decision with the
Green Street case on the constitutional issues involved. 4 ° The Seventh
Circuit in Green Street did not say that the displacees lacked standing to
sue on constitutional issues, but rather found that although condemnation
proceedings were issues for state courts, if a substantial constitutional
question is involved, the injured parties do have standing to prosecute
their claim in federal courts.' 4 ' However, because the displacees in
Green Street failed to allege that the sole purpose of the supposed con-
spiracy was to violate their constitutional rights, their suit was dis-
134. Id. at 926.
135. The intricacies of standing are outside the scope of this note except to the
extent that the courts have applied the theory directly to section 105(c) issues. A
detailed analysis is therefore not attempted. However, see generally Davis, Standing to
Challenge Government Action, 39 MINN. L. REV. 353 (1955) ; Jaffe, Standing to Secure
Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1961); Lewis, Constitutional
Rights and the Misuse of Standing, 14 STAN. L. REV. 433 (1962) ; Sedler, Standing to
Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962).
136. 395 F.2d 920, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1968).
137. Id. at 927-28.
138. Id. at 927, 935 & n.35. The court referred directly to Taft Hotel Corp. v.
HHFA, 262 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 967 (1959) and Berry v.
HHFA, 340 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1965), both were decided by the Second Circuit and
held one cannot object to governmental action on the basis that it aids one's competitors.
139. Plaintiffs' amended complaint contained only general allegations of violations
of Due Process, which the court dismissed without comment. The displacees made no
allegations which would have brought their cause within the Equal Protection Clause.
310 F.2d 99, 103 (7th Cir. 1962).
140. 395 F.2d 920, 927-29 (2d Cir. 1968).
141. Id. at 928. See also Green Street Ass'n. v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 7 (7th Cir.
1967).
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missed.142 Here, because plaintiffs alleged facts sufficient to show a
violation of equal protection, they would have standing.4 Although
both courts say that displacees have standing to seek court review of
urban renewal projects upon the constitutional claims, in practice they
seem widely divergent. The displacees in both Green Street and Norwalk
allege a substantial constitutional claim; yet, in the former, standing is
denied,' 4 while in the latter, it is permitted."' Though the Norwalk court
speaks of the similarity of the holdings, one should doubt any real
similarity in the opinions.
The Norwalk court recognized the necessity for discretionary deci-
sions in the urban renewal program, but declared that not all cases are
beyond judicial cognizance; it is necessary to review each factual situation
on a case-by-case basis. 4 The court stated that it is not its function to
inquire into the legislative intention or the discretionary actions of the
executive department; but, when standards are set, it is the function of
the judiciary to see that the same standards are applied to all." 7 This was
the essence of the plaintiffs' constitutional claim and, at least in the
Second Circuit, standing to sue will now be granted in such cases. And
the fact that discrimination is not inherent in the administration of the
program but is rather a fact of urban life, something "accidental to the
plan," does not excuse the planners from making certain that relocation
housing is available for all displacees." 8 "Equal protection of the laws
means more than merely the absence of governmental action to discrimin-
ate. . . . [T]he arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disasterous
and unfair to private rights and public interest as the perversity of a will-
ful scheme."' 49 Furthermore:
Where the relocation standard set by Congress is met for those
who have access to any housing in the community which they
can afford, but not for those who, by reason of their race, are
denied free access to housing they can afford and must pay more
for what they get, the state action affirms the discrimination
in the housing market. This is not "equal protection of the laws."'3 °
142. 373 F.2d at 6.
143. 395 F.2d 920, 932 (2d Cir. 1968).
144. 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967).
145. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
146. Id. at 929.
147. Id. at 931.
148. Id.
149. Id., citing Judge Wright in Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C.
1967).
150. 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968).
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The second basis for allowing the plaintiffs' standing to sue is
found in section 105(c) of the Housing Act of 1949."' The court
determined that the displacees had the requisite personal stake in the
agency's action and that there was no persuasive reason to believe that
Congress intended to eliminate judicial review." 2 Although finding no
language by which Congress expressly gave aggrieved parties a cause of
action, the court determined from the legislative history that it was
Congress' intent to eradicate slums, not merely to relocate them else-
where.12 ' Since the provisions of section 105(c) were centered upon
adequate rehousing after slum removal, the logical inference is that
Congress intended that displacees should have the right of judicial
review to not only protect their own rights, but also to safeguard the
public interest.'
It might be suggested that although the Second Circuit did grant
standing under the constitutional claim, its ruling regarding section
105 (c) standing was dictum, for the court did not need to decide the
issue."' However, section II of the court's opinion seems to indicate that
the statutory ruling is of equal weight: "We have found no reason to
believe that Congress intended to cut off judicial review under this
Act."' 58 Later in the opinion this statement was strengthened: "Since
Congress specifically intended to protect the displacees' interest in ade-
quate relocation, the displacees have standing." ' Near the end of the
opinion the court openly stated, "We hold, then, that judicial review of
agency action under Section 105(c) of the Act is available to dis-
placees."' 8 It appears that standing was allowed on both theories. 59
151. Housing Act of 1949 § 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1964), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1968).
152. 395 F.2d at 934. Such reasoning could also allow judicial review of relocation
procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp.
11 1965-66). See also Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal,
77 YALE L.J. 966, 970, 973-76 (1968).
153. 395 F.2d 920, 933 (2d Cir. 1968). See note 6 supra.
154. 395 F.2d at 934.
155. This contention may be supported by a literal interpretation of Judge
Smith's opening comment:
This appeal raises timely and fundamental questions regarding the availability
of the federal courts to persons who, displaced by urban renewal programs,
claim that they have been deprived of the equal protection of the laws in
connection with government efforts to assure their relocation, and that such
relocation efforts have not been adequate under the mandate of a federal
statute.
395. F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir. 1968).
156. Id. at 934.
157. Id. at 936.
158. Id.
159. It is submitted that standing should be allowed under both theories. To allow
standing under only the constitutional claim could cause hardships in many cases. First,
the real problem in most suits involving relocation is that the director has abused his
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To reach the decision that those displaced by urban renewal projects
did have standing to allege section 105 (c) violations, the Norwalk court
was in the tenuous position of distinguishing or refusing to follow sub-
stantial precedent which disallowed standing in section 105 (c) cases.
However, the only precedent from the Second Circuit bearing directly
upon the question was Gart v. Cole'6 in which the court impliedly affirmed
the lower court's ruling that displacees "seemed" to lack standing to chal-
lenge section 105 (c) provisions. By passively affirming the lower court's
dictum, the Second Circuit in Gart took no real position on the matter.
Thus, the Norwalk decision did not directly refute the earlier Second
Circuit decision and it might even be argued that the Norwalk treatment
of section 105 (c) determinations is an extension of Gart.
The Gart court also refused to grant plaintiff's standing to contest
the LPA's open bidding procedure because the sections of the Act
involved were not intended to protect the interests of individual persons
in the redevelopment area, but rather the interests of the public at large."'
In Norwalk the court ruled that "[j]udicial review obtains not only to
advance what have traditionally been viewed as 'legal rights,' but also to
vindicate the public interests, and Congress has made clear its view that
adequate relocation is in the public interest."' 62
The court attempted to distinguish the Harrison-Halsted case on
statutory as well as constitutional grounds.' Again, the point of depar-
ture was that plaintiffs sought standing to challenge decisions which
would result in economic injury to them and thus lacked standing under
section 105 (c). The validity of this economic theory is doubtful, but
raises an interesting question. The court in Norwalk openly declined
to follow the Green Street and Johnson cases regarding the statutory
decision;"64 why, then, did the court seek merely to distinguish the
Harrison-Halsted case rather than decline to follow its ruling? At least
two possibilities present themselves: 1) the court may have wished to
discretion or has been negligent by allowing the renewal project to continue in
violation of section 105(c). It would seem more reasonable to allow suits directly on
this point. rather than to require circuitous arguments of equal protection. Second, if
white and non-white persons were being relocated, to allow only the constitutional
claim could preclude whites from having their claims heard in court. The white dis-
placee would have difficulty proving racial discrimination. Third, if only minority
groups were being relocated they would have an impossible task to prove unequal
protection, for their relocation situation could in no meaningful manner be compared to
whites.
160. 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
161. 263 F.2d at 250. The Gart court relied upon Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923), which has since been modified by Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942
(1968).
162. 395 F.2d 920, 934 (2dCir. 1968). See notes 170-79 infra and accompanying text.
163. Id. at 935-36.
164. Id. at 935.
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preserve continuity between discussions of the constitutional and statutory
claims, perhaps believing it necessary to mention the economic theory in
both discussions; or 2) by distinguishing the Harrison-Halsted case on
a separate theory the court may have believed it would take weight from
the Green Street decision, which was based heavily on the former case.
To show that Green Street was decided upon a faulty premise would
lessen the impact of directly declining to follow it as precedent.
It appears that the end result of Norwalk is to grant standing to
displacees seeking to enjoin urban renewal projects, because the statutory
relocation requirements have not been met by the LPA, on at least two
different theories: 1) that the fourteenth Amendment right of equal pro-
tection has been violated; or 2) that Congress intended to give the right to
judicial review to those displacees substantially alleging violations of
section 105 (c) provisions."'
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF NORWALK UPON EXISTING LAW
The ambiguity of "standing to sue" has long been a problem for the
courts and the bar,166 and often the decisions in "standing" cases are
understandable only when analyzed along with dominant policy consider-
ations relevant to the litigated issues.'67 The leading case in the area of
constitutional standing is Frothingham v. Mellon,"'s in which the Supreme
Court refused to allow a federal taxpayer standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a Massachusett's maternity statute. 169
The repercussions of this decision have been felt in the urban renewal
165. Id. at 932, 936. The plaintiffs also alleged violation of section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964) as a third basis for standing. The
court did not think it should decide that issue because "we do not read the section to
set forth requirements differing from what is required of the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment .. " 395 F.2d at 936 n.40.
166. See note 135 supra.
167. The foremost policy against allowing standing to displacees is the delay in
the urban renewal programs which could result from judicial supervision of administra-
tive policies. The court in Norwalk warned of unnecessary delay: "This does not mean,
of course, that the courts are to intervene in relocation activities at the behest of every
displacee disappointed in his relocation. Familiar doctrines limit the occasions on which
particular judicial remedies, if any, are appropriate." 395 F.2d at 937. See also
ABRAMS 141-42 (delays in a Washington, D.C. renewal project resulting from lawsuits,
submission of numerous plans and a myriad of federal approval); Note, Judicial
Review of Urban Redevelopment Agency Determinations, 69 YALE L.J. 321
(1959) this last article cites five policy reasons against delay in urban renewal projects:
1) the city suffers tax losses on the renewal property in the interim; 2)
the city after a delay may be unable to meet commitments with private developers and
therefore lose the project; 3) yearly rises in construction rates result in higher costs
to the LPA as well as HUD; 4) public support wanes with the passage of time;
and 5) judicial review encourages hold-up suits. Id. at 327.
168. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
169. Id.
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field. In the Harrison-Halsted7 ° and Green Street 7 ' cases, the plaintiff's
complaints were dismissed partly because of the Frothingham doctrine." 2
However, on June 10, 1968, the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen7 '
allowed taxpayers standing to sue to enjoin expenditures of public funds
on parochial schools, as provided by federal statutes, 7 ' when such statutes
allegedly violated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment. The Majority of the Court, speaking through
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, expressly modified the rule in Frothingham
and held that the de minimus doctrine had no application where con-
stitutional rights are concerned.' More important than the quantity of
legal protection granted by the courts was the quality of that protection.
Although it might be shown that the plaintiff's real monetary interest in
the case was insignificant, financial interest was not controlling: rather
it was the principle involved upon which the issue of standing turned.7 "
In the Flast case, Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in result, but
would apparently abolish the Frothingham rule outright because the
doctrine would eventually be distinguished to a point of non-existence. 7 '
Justice Fortas and Justice Stewart concurred in a more conservative vein.
The decision meant only that a taxpayer may now maintain a suit to
challenge the validity of a federal expenditure on the ground that such
expenditure violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.'
The possible effect of Flast upon standing prohibitions under section
105 (c) is at this point impossible to determine.' It may have no effect
170. 3,10 F.2d 99, 103-04 (7th Cir. 1962).
171. 373 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1967).
172. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
173. 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968).
174. Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20
U.S.C. §§ 241a, 821 (Supp. 1966).
175. 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968). The de minimus doctrine, as enunciated
in Frothingham, is that the federal taxpayer's monetary interest is comparatively minute
and indeterminable when compared to a municipal taxpayer's interest. Under this theory
one lacks standing to contest tax expenditures, not because he is a taxpayer, but because
his tax bill is not large enough. Id.
176. 88 S. Ct. at 1955-56.
177. Id. at 1956.
178. Id. at 1960.
179. In analyzing the Flast decision in regard to displacee standing under section
105(c), there appears to be an easing of strict standing requirements which perhaps
shows a beginning of a change of attitude in the federal courts.
Before Flast the prevailing view of commentators was that Forthingham announced
only a non-constitutional rule of self-restraint. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REV. 225, 302-03 (1961); see Davis, Standing
to Challenge Government Action, 39 MINN. L. REv. 353, 386-91 (1955). If there is an
attitudinal change in the federal courts regarding standing, perhaps it will be reflected
in section 105(c) cases. Since there are now different rulings among the circuits regard-
ing section 105(c) determinations, perhaps in the near future the Supreme Court will
decide the issue.
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at all for it may be strictly limited to standing to assert First Amendment
rights, or in a broader vein, constitutional rights, which have been
violated. However, it may be possible to discern a general liberalization
of standing requirements. Perhaps as the Supreme Court abrogated the
de minimus doctrine in the interest of First Amendment rights, other
federal courts will abolish the questionable theories which now disallow
standing to challenge section 105 (c) violations.
CONCLUSION
It appears that judicial review of administrative findings will be
necessary if urban renewal projects are to meet the relocation require-
ments of a workable program. As long as federal housing directors fail to
require a feasible relocation plan, slum eradication as envisaged by
Congress in the Housing Act of 1949 will be little more than slum
displacement. It is essential for progress in the fight against urban decay
that decent, safe and sanitary rehousing be available for displacees. The
history of the past fifteen years seems to indicate that this goal will
not be achieved as long as the director has non-reviewable discretion
regarding relocation requirements.
Norwalk has been the first case to realistically deal with the reloca-
tion problem."' At this time, only the Second Circuit has granted standing
to displacees challenging a relocation program."' Hopefully, this view will
180. Handler, Urban Renewal and Related Projects, in NEWSLETTER (Ill. State
Bar Ass'n, May, No. 1, 1968).
181. A decision which may have great importance was recently delivered by the
Federal District Court for Northern California. The district court allowed displacees
standing to challenge inadequate relocation plans of the San Francisco Redevelopment
Agency and granted injunctive relief pending submission of a workable relocation
program by the agency. In 1964 the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency submitted
plans to HUD for approval of the Western Addition II Project. The plans were
approved in mid-1966, but HUD required the Agency to reappraise the relocation plans
by mid-1967. A second relocation program was submitted and found inadequate. The
agency's third plan was approved in July, 1968. While these plans shuttled back and
forth between San Francisco and Washington, D.C., the project continued. The
Western Addition Community Organization (WACO) brought suit in January, 1968,
to enjoin the project until a workable relocation program was developed. In addition to
allowing standing and granting injunctive relief, the court reserved the right to review
future HUD policies and determinations regarding the project.
In its decision, the court referred to the Norwalk case, and it might appear, there-
fore, that Norwalk has started a trend in section 105(c) cases. Two aspects of the case
are especially worthy of attention: 1) this is the first federal district court to grant
standing to displacees aleging section 105 (c) violations (the district court in Norwalk, as
well as the other circuits on both the district and appellate levels, have denied standing) ;
and 2) this decision was rendered by a Ninth Circuit district court, the same circuit
that denied standing to displacees in Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Oakland, 317
F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963) on both the district and appellate
levels. At the time of publication the full text of the court's opinion was not available.
There was no opportunity, therefore, to determine how the court avoided the impact of
Johnson; however, it should be noted that the district court did render a decision
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gain majority status, for only when suits are allowed under section
105 (c) to contest the adequacy of relocation provisions will the work-
able program become truly workable.
contrary to the existing precedent of its circuit. See Housing Progress: Community
Challenge Halts Relocation In San Francisco Project, LAW IN AcTIoN, Jan., 1969, at 1.
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